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Competition and Firm Productivity: 
Evidence from Portugal 
 
Abstract 
This master thesis presents empirical evidence on the impact of competition on firm 
productivity for the Portuguese economy. To that effect, firm-level panel data comprising 
information between 2010 and 2015 gathered from the Integrated Business Accounts System 
(Portuguese acronym: SCIE) is used. The database enables the construction of economic and 
financial indicators, which allow for isolating the impact of competition on firm-level 
productivity. We find a negative relationship between the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which 
proxies competition, and both total factor productivity and labor productivity. This relationship 
is found to be robust to different specifications and in accordance with the results in the 
literature obtained for other countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Competition is the process of rivalry between firms with the goal of gaining sales and making 
or increasing profits. It can have a significant impact on market outcomes. According to 
Godfrey (2008) “effective competition is a driver of productivity” and “facilitates greater 
equality of opportunity by breaking down the barriers to fair competition that often help to 
protect incumbent elites.” Several features are critical to guaranteeing a competitive business 
environment. Free entry implies an increase in allocational efficiency insofar as it drives prices 
closer to marginal costs (static efficiency). In addition, competition increases the likelihood that 
firms will reduce the use of inputs in the production process, attaining higher levels of 
productive efficiency. Firms that cannot make such adjustments tend to lose business, which 
reduces their market share in favor of more productive firms. Moreover, competition drives 
firms to innovate through the creation of new products, or the differentiation of existing ones 
(dynamic efficiency).  
Using a firm-level panel database ranging from 2010 to 2015, this paper investigates 
empirically the effect of competition on firm productivity in the Portuguese economy. The 
database comprises a set of variables that have been found to be determinants of productivity 
at the firm level. Thus, we are able to isolate the impact of competition on firm-level 
productivity. The main results show that market concentration, which proxies for competition, 
has a negative relation to both total factor productivity and labor productivity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 encompasses a literature review. Section 3 
presents the data and methodology used for the calculation of productivity and level of 
concentration. Results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature Review 
The assessment of the impact of competition on productivity at the aggregate and firm levels is 
widely treated in the literature. This section begins by summarizing the main theoretical and 
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between the level of competition and 
productivity. Then, we will describe evidence regarding each of the mechanisms by which 
competition boosts productivity: across-firm effects, innovation, and within-firm effects. 
The theoretical research on endogenous growth presents distinctive results regarding the link 
between competition and productivity. Romer (1986) states that an increase in competition 
between producers reduces the expected duration of innovation, expected future profits due to 
innovation, and the rate of technical change. Thus, in his framework, competition reduces the 
incentives to innovate. On the other hand, using an extension of the standard model of 
endogenous technological change Aghion (2001) concludes that the incentive to innovate in 
order to beat the competition is higher if a firm is closer to the technological frontier. In other 
words, firms that present higher levels of productivity tend to have more incentive to innovate 
than do low productivity firms, which tend to adopt low-cost technologies. In short, the 
direction of the impact of competition on productivity is not the same across all theoretical 
models. 
Some empirical literature examines the impact of a change in the competitive environment 
on productivity at the aggregate level. Barseghyan (2008) estimates that an increase of 8% in 
income per capita in entry costs reduces total factor productivity by 22%. However, the use of 
micro-level data provides larger sample sizes, which helps to reduce the issue of unobserved 
firm heterogeneity while allowing for a more detailed analysis. However, firm-level databases 
do not exist for all countries. Moreover, not all that do exist have the variables needed to 
calculate the level of competition or productivity. Haskel (1991) was one of the first authors to 
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use micro-level data to examine the impact of competition on productivity across product 
markets. Using UK panel data between 1980 and 1986, he finds that both higher levels of 
concentration and market share have a negative impact on total factor productivity. Nickell 
(1996) found that a 10% increase in price markups has a negative impact of 1.2 to 1.6 
percentage points (on average) on total factor productivity growth in 700 British manufacturing 
firms between 1972 and 1986. He also found a positive impact of the number of competitors 
on productivity. This corroborates Haskel’s findings that there is a negative relationship 
between market power and productivity. Disney et al. (2003) use a more extensive dataset 
comprising approximately 140,000 UK manufacturing firms between 1980 and 1992. This 
allows them to capture the contribution of low productivity firms that may exit the market due 
to high levels of competition. The authors corroborate the previous studies by demonstrating 
that a reduction in market share and past profits have a negative impact on productivity. More 
recently, Ospina and Schiffbauer (2010) used firm observations compiled by the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey database from countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They found that 
firms with a 20 percent higher markup have, on average, a 1.2 percent lower total factor 
productivity level and a 8 percent lower labor productivity. They test the stability of these 
results using a survey-based approach, based on the level of competition reported by each firm’s 
manager. 
The studies highlighted above strongly suggest a positive relationship between competition 
and productivity. Nevertheless, they do not pinpoint the mechanisms by which competition 
impacts productivity. There are three mechanisms through which stronger competition leads to 
higher productivity: between-firm effects, within-firm effects and innovation. 
The first mechanism is the “between-firm,” “across-firm” or “market sorting” effect. When 
low productivity firms exit the market, their market share is captured by high-productivity 
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firms, entailing a subsequent positive cross-firm impact on productivity. Competition 
guarantees that low-productivity firms exit the market to be replaced by more productive firms. 
Moreover, competition can place pressure on firms to reduce the gap between their practice 
and the most efficient practice. In other words, competition reduces X-inefficiency. This is the 
“within-firm” effect. In a competitive environment, inefficient firms are unable to stay in the 
market in the long run. Therefore, competition can act as a discipline device, placing pressure 
on managers. These will face an incentive to avoid slack in the production process, thereby 
using resources more efficiently. In markets in which the level of competition is lower, 
managers can reduce their effort without unduly increasing the likelihood of going out of 
business or being replaced. 
Competition might also drive firms to innovate. Innovation creates dynamic efficiency 
through the creation of new products, differentiation of existing ones, or technological progress 
in general. This mechanism is complex. On the one hand, in the presence of strong competition 
firms will have an incentive to innovate to gain a competitive advantage. This advantage can 
be achieved by differentiating their products, creating new ones, or reducing costs. On the other 
hand, this incentive is only present if the firm garners a positive return from its move, which 
requires a need for ex post market power. 
Several authors have looked into each of these three mechanisms empirically, rather than 
considering them simultaneously. Regarding the between-firm effect, Syverson (2004) finds 
evidence in the case of the United States that competition drives low-productivity firms out of 
business. He observes that in competitive geographic markets there is a smaller tail of low-
productivity plants. Arnold et al. (2011) argue that the between-firm effect has a more 
substantial impact on productivity growth than within-firm improvements. Furthermore, 
several empirical studies have quantified the impact of this mechanism on productivity growth. 
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As an illustration, Baldwin and Gu (2006) estimate that approximately 70% of productivity 
growth in the Canadian manufacturing industry (between 1979 and 1999) is due to the market-
sorting effect. Disney et al. (2003) suggest that this effect accounts for between 80% and 90% 
of total factor productivity growth and roughly 50% of labor productivity growth in UK 
manufacturing firms between 1980 and 1992. Harris and Li (2008) found that 79% of UK 
productivity growth is due to the market-sorting effect. Scarpetta et al. (2002) conducted work 
on ten OECD countries for varying periods and observed that the between-firm effect accounted 
for 20% to 40% of total productivity growth. It is important to underscore that the impact of the 
market-sorting effect varies with the degree of maturity of the market. This mechanism tends 
to have a more significant impact in less mature industries. 
The link between competition and productivity through innovation is also relatively well 
studied in the literature. Cameron (2003) found that a 1% increase in R&D, which proxies for 
innovation, raises total factor productivity by 0.2% to 0.3% in UK manufacturing firms. Griffith 
et al. (2010) look at the effect of the introduction of the Single Market Program in Europe. They 
conclude that it is associated with an increase of 1.2% in R&D intensity, which is responsible 
for a growth of 0.7 percentage points in total factor productivity in the UK metal industry. 
Moreover, the effect of increased competition is stronger in countries that are closer to the 
global technological frontier. 
Correa and Ornaghi (2014) found a positive relationship between competition and patent 
count, which proxies for innovation, leading to higher levels of labor productivity and total 
factor productivity. Aghion et al. (2005, 2009) found an inverted U-shape relationship between 
competition and innovation. When markets are highly concentrated, an increase in competition 
leads to an increase in innovation. Nevertheless, beyond a certain threshold, a positive increase 
in competition can have a negative impact on innovation. Bearing in mind Aghion’s findings, 
one may wonder if competition authorities are encouraging “too much” competition. 
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Nevertheless, the interventions of competition authorities target markets in which the level of 
competition is relatively low. All in all, the literature tends to suggest that competition spurs 
innovation, which in turn drives higher productivity. 
A negative relationship between competition and X-inefficiency was also found empirically 
by several authors. Using 580 UK manufacturing firms, Nickell et al. (1997) show that 
competition is a substitute for financial pressure and other discipline devices regarding the 
impact on productivity. They also show that the effect of competition on X-inefficiency is 
weaker in the presence of other discipline devices.  Griffith (2001) finds that in firms in which 
management and ownership are separated (giving rise to the well-known principal-agent 
problem) competition increases productivity, while firms which are owned by the manager do 
not display growth. On the whole, the literature suggests a positive impact of competition 
through all the three channels (between-firm effects, within-firm effects and innovation) on 
firm-level productivity. 
3. Dataset and Empirical Methodology to Calculate Productivity 
and Competition 
 
Our firm-level panel data set was constructed from Sistema de Contas Integrado das Empresas 
(Integrated Business Accounts System, Portuguese acronym: SCIE). SCIE contains 
information on firm-specific characteristics, such as turnover, services, materials, number of 
employees, and industry. It comprises all Portuguese firms between 2010 and 2015. This 
enables the computation of economic and financial indicators, which are used to isolate the 
impact of competition on firm-level productivity. 
Following Correia and Gouveia (2016), firms in the financial industry, public sector, 
education, health, entertainment-related activities, other services, international organizations 
and other institutions, and all the non-specified cases were excluded since the level of 
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competition and/or productivity cannot be adequately captured with the methodology used. 
Firms which do not report labor costs, external supplies and services, non-positive fixed 
tangible and intangible assets, current and non-current assets and liabilities were excluded. 
Moreover, following Barbosa and Pinho (2016), firms with less than five workers were not 
considered either. The data was further treated after its descriptive analysis, as detailed below.  
3.1 Productivity 
Two types of firm productivity are considered, namely, total factor productivity (TFP) and 
Labor Productivity. To calculate total factor productivity, we use three different approaches: 
Levinsohn and Petrin’s approach, the conventional OLS procedure and an OLS procedure using 
year and industry fixed-effects (henceforth, LevPet, OLS and Fixed-effects, respectively).  
According to the OECD (2017), total factor productivity “reflects the overall efficiency with 
which labor and capital inputs are used together in the production process.” Therefore, this 
measure of productivity can be impacted by management practices, network effects, and 
economies of scale, among others.  The calculation of total factor productivity requires the 
computation of a residual of the production function. Thus, the results depend on the choice of 
functional form, the definition and measurement of the variables used in the calculation and the 
estimation procedure. 
A standard manner of calculating total factor productivity was suggested by Olley and Pakes 
(1996). This approach addresses simultaneity and selection bias, generating consistent 
estimates of the production function elasticities,1 which neither OLS approach does. 
Nevertheless, one of the conditions that must be met for this method to be applied is a strictly 
monotonous relationship between the proxy for unobserved productivity shocks, which in this 
                                                           
1 For more information regarding the main issues concerning TFP estimation it is suggested as 
reference Olley and Pakes (1996) and Eberhardt and Helmers (2010). 
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case is investment, and output. As a result, any firm with a zero investment in one year would 
has to be dropped.  
Another approach is the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. This methodology follows a 
semi-parametric approach and addresses simultaneity and selection bias. It also assumes that 
productivity is the only unobservable variable. It uses intermediate inputs as a proxy for 
unobserved productivity shocks, instead of investments was the case in Olley and Pakes (1996). 
SCIE contains fewer zero observations in external supplies and services than in investment. 
Therefore, Levinsohn and Petrin’s approach was the method selected to calculate total factor 
productivity. 
In the estimation process, turnover was used as the output measure. One could have used 
value added instead. Nevertheless, Basu and Fernald (1997) prove the existence of biased 
returns to scale under value added production functions unless price equals marginal costs and 
the elasticity between inputs and materials equals zero. These conditions are violated in several 
Portuguese markets. 
The net book value of fixed tangible assets was used as physical capital, labor costs as labor 
and external supplies and services as materials. No measures of human capital were included 
due to lack of information in the database. Therefore, the estimation assumes homogeneity of 
the labor force. 
Total factor productivity was also calculated using the conventional OLS procedure and the 
OLS procedure using market and year fixed effects. Labor productivity is measured as the ratio 
of gross value added at factor costs to the number of employees. Due to the absence of 
information regarding the number of hours of work, it was assumed that a part-time employee 
was equivalent to a full-time employee.  
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The estimated coefficients for the inputs, labor, capital and material can be found in Table 1 
for the three different methods of estimating the production function. As expected, one can 
observe a significant difference between the coefficients of the variable capital and materials 
across the three regressions. The coefficient of the variable materials is higher in both OLS 
procedures than in the one based on the Levinsohn and Petrin approach, which is in line with 
the results in Muendler (2004).  
Regarding returns to scale, the LevPet approach presents decreasing returns to scale, while 
the conventional OLS and the OLS with fixed effects display constant returns to scale. These 
results are consistent with those obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) regarding the sum of 
elasticities: the LevPet approach presents lower values than both OLS approaches.  
Table 2 displays the correlation coefficients between the measures of total factor 
productivity and labor productivity. The correlation between the conventional OLS procedure 
and the OLS procedure using relevant market and year fixed effects is higher than 0.99. 
Therefore, we opted to report the results of the three different methodologies while excluding 
the conventional OLS procedure.2 
Figure 1 plots the distribution of the logarithm of the three different measures of 
productivity. One can observe the differences in dispersion and range. There seems to be a 




                                                           
2 For more information about correlation coefficients of different measures of productivity see 
Van Biesebroeck (2003). 
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3.2 Competition 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI, is one of the most widely used empirical indicators of 
a market’s level of competition. This index assesses market concentration as a function of the 
number of competitors and the distribution of market shares among them. It is defined as: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  , (1) 
where N stands for the total number of firms in market j, and si denotes the market share of firm 
i. 
In a monopoly, HHI equals one, while in a perfect competition scenario the index takes a 
value close to zero.  The presumed link between market concentration and the level of 
competition is the following: there is a higher likelihood of the market being less competitive, 
allowing firms to set relatively high prices, when concentration is higher.  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index has some methodological limitations. One of them is that 
to compute the HHI correctly one needs to have information about all firms in the market. 
Another methodological issue is that national databases do not have information about external 
competitors. This is particularly important in markets exposed to international trade. Therefore, 
in the case of tradables, the conclusions are particularly limited. Finally, defining the relevant 
market for which to compute the index can be quite difficult. 
These problems were partially solved. First, the dataset includes all firms in the Portuguese 
economy. Secondly, following the Amador and Soares (2012) approach, the relevant 
geographic market is assumed to be the Portuguese domestic market. Each relevant product 
market is assumed to be consistent with the CAE (Classification of Economic Activity) 3.1 
classification at the 3-digit level. This assumption means that each firm sells one good and 
competes in one market. In the case of a multi-product firm, if products are not close substitutes, 
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this assumption may be a source of bias. Different market definitions, of course, will lead to 
different results when computing the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
Moreover, in certain cases, the direction of change in the HHI can be the opposite of the 
change in the level of competition. As an illustration, take a decrease in the cost of entry leading 
a multinational firm to enter the market. The level of competition increases because of the 
reduction in entry barriers, yet the level of concentration, measured by the HHI, may have 
increased.  
Despite all these limitations, we assume that the HHI can capture the level of competition in 
a market with a reasonable degree of precision. Competition authorities all over the world 
accept or deny mergers based on the magnitude of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. To check 
for the robustness of the results obtained with the HHI, we also used the concentration ratios 
C10 and C4 as a proxy for the level of competition. 
3.3 Further treatments of the database 
Due to the complexity of the database, SCIE, we had no choice but to treat the data. We did not 
include firms whose levels of productivity are too high. For this purpose, technological 
companies such as Google and Apple were used as a benchmark. Any firm with labor 
productivity above 1.7 Million euros per employee per year was excluded from our final model. 
Typically, these are holding companies. While financial indicators refer to all the subsidiaries, 
the number of employees refers to the parent firm.3 Clearly, productivity cannot be accurately 
calculated in these situations. Firms that went out of business in one year and returned in a 
following year were also excluded. 
                                                           
3 However, the calculation of the measures of the levels of concentration does consider these 
firms. 
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There is a set of firms whose market changed over the years. This could have a significant 
impact on the HHI of both markets. We decided to exclude all the relevant markets where this 
occurred and the firms did not belong to a competitive fringe, i.e., were not small. We assume 
that a firm is small if it has a market share at most twenty times smaller than the largest firm 
operating in its market. 
Table 3 defines several variables used in calculating the empirical relationship between 
productivity and competition in 2010 and 2015. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics. 
4. Empirical Relation between Firm Productivity and Competition 
The previous section described the measures of firm productivity and competition that were 
used in the second-stage regression. The estimation of the empirical model allows us to compute 
how much of the variation in firm-level total factor productivity and labor productivity is related 
to variations in competition.  
The empirical model is described by equation (2) below. The model includes a set of firm-
specific control variables (Xit). These controls were identified by Gonçalves and Martins (2016) 
as determinants of total factor productivity. Further variables identified in the literature were 
also considered. These determinants are the size of the firm, export and import status, the ratio 
of debt-to-equity, subsidies and wages. We used the size of the firm according to the European 
Commission definition. The criterium of the Bank of Portugal is used to define if a company is 
an exporter. Several authors, such as Correia and Gouveia (2016), take the level of a firm’s 
internationalization as a proxy for competitiveness. Detailed information about the computation 
of the variables can be found in Table 3. The inclusion of these specific controls allows us to 
isolate the effect of competition on firm-level productivity. 
                                        𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑡 + 𝜂𝑗 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 . (2) 
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Industry (𝜂𝑗), years (µ𝑡), and firm (𝜔𝑖) fixed effects were introduced to account for 
unobservable heterogeneity among industries, years, and firms. The inclusion of year and 
industry fixed effects is a standard method as economic shocks can have an asymmetric impact 
in different years and industries. In addition, the use of firm fixed effects accounts for the 
heterogeneity among firms that cannot be captured by the data. One example is two otherwise 
similar firms with CEOs whose level of sophistication differs. Moreover, both the Hausman 
test and the robust version of the Hausman test indicate that firm fixed effects should be used. 
The ultimate goal of this work is to estimate the sign of 𝛽𝑐. When the level of competition 
is measured using the logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the a priori hypothesis is 
that an increase in the HHI is associated with a decrease in productivity. Therefore, we expect 
the sign of 𝛽𝑐 to be negative and significantly different from zero. 
Table 5 reports the results of our models. The coefficients show that the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index is negatively correlated with all the measures of productivity used. Firms 
operating in a market with a 1 percent higher HHI will have, on average, a 1.3 percent lower 
total factor productivity based on Levinsohn and Petrin’s approach and a 1.1 percent lower TFP 
based on the OLS procedure using year and industry fixed effects, ceteris paribus. Regarding 
labor productivity, a 1% increase in the HHI lowers it, on average, by 1.7%.  
Several tests were run to check the robustness of the results. We test the same model using 
the concentration ratio C10 and C4. The results are to be found in Table 6. We also used other 
econometric specifications, namely a random effects model. The results were found to be robust 
in all cases. A model that included a quadratic term of the HHI was also tested. No quadratic 
relationship between competition and productivity was found. 
The effects of the additional control variables on productivity are broadly consistent with 
the theoretical predictions and the empirical findings in the literature.  
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Regarding the models using TFP, they show that firms that are exporters and importers are 
more productive. This result is consistent with the findings of Gonçalves and Martins (2016), 
Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004). Gehringer et al. (2013) and Gonçalves and Martins 
(2016) also found a positive relationship between wages and TFP. Again, Gonçalves and 
Martins (2016) also suggest a negative association between the debt-to-equity ratio and TFP.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper uses firm-level data from 2010 to 2015 to isolate the effect of competition on 
productivity using data for the Portuguese economy. The results suggest a negative relationship 
between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and three different measures of productivity. Markets 
that have a 10 percent higher HHI have, on average, firms with 13 (TFP LevPet) and 11.2 (TPF 
OLS fixed effects) percent lower total factor productivity and 17 percent lower labor 
productivity. 
The results are in line with Ospina and Schiffbauer (2010), who found a negative association 
between price-cost margins and total factor productivity and labor productivity for 27 countries. 
Further research should assess which of the three mechanisms (between-firm effects, within-
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Appendix 
FIGURE 1: Histograms 
 
 
TABLE 1: Comparison of alternative production function estimates 
Variables LevPet OLS Fixed-effects 
Capital (k) 0.07*** 0.038259*** 0.032265*** 
 (0.004819) (0.004131) (0.0003685) 
Labor (l) 0.394091*** 0.391949*** 0.361015*** 
 (0.001629) (0.0007601) (0.0006835) 
Material (m) 0.44*** 0.575819*** 0.612551*** 
 (0.023482) (0.0007754) (0.006952) 
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TFP LevPet 1.0000    
TFP OLS 0.9699 1.0000   
TFP fixed effects 0.9694 0.9995 1.0000  
Labor productivity 0.3264 0.2154 0.2139 1.0000 
 
TABLE 3: Description of several variables 
Micro – takes value 1 if a firm has less than ten employees and a turnover and balance 
sheet total less than 2 million euro, 0 otherwise. 
Small – takes value 1 if a firm has less than 50 employees and a turnover and balance 
sheet total less than 2 million euro and micro takes value 0, 0 otherwise. 
Medium – takes value 1 if a firm has less than 250 employees and a turnover and balance 
sheet total less than 43 million euro, less than 50 million euros turnover and both micro 
and medium take value 0, 0 otherwise. 
Large – takes value 1 if micro, small and large take value 0, 0 otherwise. 
dumexportbdp – Takes value 1 if at least 50% of annual turnover is from exports or at 
least 10% of annual turnover is from exports with a value higher than 150.000€, 0 
otherwise. 
Dumimports – Takes value 1 if the firm imported any quantity of input, 0 otherwise. 
Dumsubsidies – Takes value 1 if the firm received any subsidy, 0 otherwise. 
Lnwages – Logarithm of the wage per worker. 
Lndebttoequity – Logarithm of the ratio Debt to Equity. 
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TABLE 4: Descriptive statistics 
 Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. 
    2015 2015 2015 
lnTFPLevPet 282838 2.668434 0.7465825 45247 2.699476 0.7375017 
lnTFP FE 282838 0.0817256 0.7305094 45247 0.0848798 0.7229256 
lnLabor Prod. 283116 9.501782 0.8582338 45978 9.579484 0.8351969 
lnhhi 295732 -4.867674 1.657148 47789 -4.842326 1.660887 
micro 295732 0.6205314 0.4852556 47789 0.6118981 0.4873231 
small 295732 0.3221396 0.4672969 47789 0.3285275 0.4696827 
medium 295732 0.0494333 0.2167713 47789 0.0512461 0.2205016 
large 295732 0.0078957 0.0885062 47789 0.0083283 0.0908795 
dumexportbdp 295732 0.0662424 0.2487058 47789 0.0720668 0.2586012 
dumimports 295732 0.2468417 0.4311746 47789 0.2592647 0.4382357 
lndebttoequity 235026 0.603142 1.469037 37804 0.4517403 1.439234 
lnwages 294202 8.870233 0.614079 47549 8.908375 0.5988192 
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TABLE 5: Fixed effect estimator: competition and productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES lnTFP LevPet lnTFP OLS Fixed-effects lnLabor Productivity 
    
lnhhi -0.0130** -0.0112* -0.0170*** 
 (0.00603) (0.00619) (0.00652) 
small 0.0576*** 0.0248*** -0.0521*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00390) (0.00507) 
medium 0.155*** 0.0817*** -0.0512*** 
 (0.00926) (0.00912) (0.0118) 
large 0.257*** 0.137*** -0.0207 
 (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0332) 
dumexportbdp 0.103*** 0.0872*** 0.0734*** 
 (0.00662) (0.00653) (0.00842) 
lndebttoequity -0.0270*** -0.0244*** -0.0823*** 
 (0.00125) (0.00124) (0.00198) 
dumimports 0.0302*** 0.0235*** 0.0163*** 
 (0.00264) (0.00262) (0.00371) 
lnwages 0.0432*** -0.00197 0.673*** 
 (0.00617) (0.00620) (0.00930) 
dummysubsidies -0.00925*** -0.0160*** 0.0129*** 
 (0.00223) (0.00226) (0.00305) 
Constant 2.703*** 0.540*** 3.910*** 
 (0.0812) (0.0850) (0.134) 
    
Observations 226,287 226,287 230,438 
Number of firms 58,906 58,906 60,041 
R-squared 0.940 0.937 0.844 
    
Industry and Year    
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors t-statistics in parenthesis.  










 – 24 – 
TABLE 6: Fixed effect estimator: competition and productivity (robustness test) 
















       
lnc4 -0.0223**  -0.0193**  -0.0173*  
 (0.00876)  (0.00893)  (0.00961)  
lnc10  -0.0358***  -0.0287**  -0.0704*** 
  (0.0125)  (0.0127)  (0.0138) 
small 0.0722*** 0.0721*** 0.0185*** 0.0185*** -0.0376*** -0.0377*** 
 (0.00323) (0.00323) (0.00320) (0.00320) (0.00360) (0.00360) 
medium 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.0572*** 0.0570*** -0.0149* -0.0150* 
 (0.00727) (0.00727) (0.00717) (0.00717) (0.00765) (0.00765) 
large 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.0974*** 0.0975*** 0.0684*** 0.0683*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0218) (0.0219) 
dumexportbdp 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.0844*** 0.0843*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.00583) (0.00584) (0.00576) (0.00577) (0.00671) (0.00672) 
dumimports 0.0470*** 0.0469*** 0.0361*** 0.0360*** 0.0453*** 0.0453*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00251) (0.00249) (0.00249) (0.00322) (0.00322) 
lndebttoequity -0.0243*** -0.0243*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.0660*** -0.0660*** 
 (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00130) (0.00130) 
lnwages 0.0520*** 0.0520*** -0.00921* -0.00924* 0.690*** 0.690*** 
 (0.00476) (0.00476) (0.00476) (0.00476) (0.00616) (0.00616) 
dumsubsidies -0.0160*** -0.0161*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 0.0148*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.00214) (0.00214) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00273) (0.00273) 
Constant 2.516*** 2.518*** 0.494*** 0.496*** 3.938*** 3.915*** 
 (0.182) (0.182) (0.184) (0.184) (0.0953) (0.0950) 
       
Observations 226,261 226,181 226,261 226,181 230,412 230,334 
Number of id 58,092 58,885 58,902 58,885 60,037 60,020 
R-squared 0.939 0.939 0.937 0.937 0.844 0.844 
       
Industry and        
Year Fixed Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Effects       
 
      
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors t-statistics in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
